employee from 01.01.2001 to 01.01.2025
Moscow, Moscow, Russian Federation
UDC 65
The article proposes an organizational and economic model for assessing the economic effectiveness of business process outsourcing that integrates transaction cost economics, agency theory, the resource-based view, and reliability theory of governance systems. It is shown that an excess of internal execution costs over the sum of the vendor price, transaction costs, and agency costs constitutes only a nominal economic potential for outsourcing; a probabilistic interpretation of the organizational maturity index as the dependability of a series governance system allows an analytical derivation of the maturity threshold at which the expected effect of process transfer becomes positive. Based on a comparison of financial-accounting, IT-support, and HR-administrative contours, the article formulates theoretical propositions, applicability criteria, a generalized dependency for the aggregate expected economic effect, and conditions for scaling outsourcing decisions. The scientific novelty lies in the formal integration of an institutional-economic feasibility criterion for process transfer with a probabilistically grounded criterion of organizational readiness for its realization within a unified process-contour model.
business process outsourcing, transaction cost economics, agency costs, resource-based view, asset specificity, governance maturity, reliability theory, expected economic effect, theory of the firm
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